Louis_J_Sheehan

No. 149
September 12, 1941
#557.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

(Part 2 of 6)

The proposal as originally advanced by the Japanese Government provided for the exercise of good offices by the President of the United States, and the Japanese Government was informed that the Government of the United States was not prepared to suggest to the Chinese Government that it undertake negotiations with the Japanese Government unless the Government of the United States was convinced that the terms which the Government of Japan had in mind were consistent with the principles to which the American Government is committed. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire A deadlock was reached in the informal discussions between our two governments in regard to these terms as a result of the insistence on the part of the Japanese Government that Japanese troops were to be stationed in Inner Mongolia and North China for an unspecified period, and also because of the fact that the Government of the United States was not able to elicit from the Japanese Government specific assurances that the principles of non-discrimination in commercial relations between nations would be applicable to the program of economic collaboration with China which Japan proposed to adopt.

The Government of the United States has consistently sought an agreement the aim and terms of which shall lead to an all-embracing and durable peace in Eastern Asia and in the area of the Pacific.
http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET
Trans. 9-12-41

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No. 150
September 12, 1941
#557.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

(Part 3 of 6)

The latest proposals submitted by the Japanese Government, it would appear, seek to break the deadlock, not by responding to the desires of the United States Government on the above points, but by proposing that Japan shall negotiate with China directly, on the premise that, since the good offices of the President are not to be sought, the Government of the United States would not be concerned with the character of the terms of peace which Japan intends to propose to China or with the progress of the conflict between China and Japan. Any such premise as the foregoing passes over or ignores the intention of the United States Government, which has been repeatedly impressed upon the Japanese Ambassador, to confer with the Government of China, Great Britain, the Netherlands, etc., before it could agree to embark on any definitive negotiations with the Japanese Government regarding a settlement involving the Pacific area. This intention of the Government of the United States is based on its view that the peace of the Pacific is not a question which can be decided by the United States and Japan alone but is a question in which other powers having interest in the Pacific have a legitimate concern and unavoidable responsibilities.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 151
September 12, 1941
#557.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

(Part 4 of 6)

Nor would the Government of the United States be prepared to conclude any agreement which would restrict the degree of assistance that it is now rendering or may in the future wish to render to nations which are engaged in resisting aggression. It is possible to assume that the Government of China, to no less a degree than the Government of Japan, desires to effect a peaceful solution of its controversies with Japan, and that, therefore, provided the Japanese Government is ready to propose equitable and just terms to the Chinese Government, the two nations should find it possible to settle their difficulties. In the event of such an occurrence the need for any provision such as that embodied in point (A) of the commitments which it is proposed that the Government of the United States undertake would appear to be eliminated.

In the light of the considerations set forth above it is clear that some further initiative from the Japanese Government is required in order to effect a solution of the above-mentioned difficulties. It would be of assistance to the Government of the United States if an answer could be obtained from the Japanese Government to the following questions which have arisen as the result of the discussions:

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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 152
September 12, 1941
#557.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

(Part 5 of 6)
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
1. In point (A) of the provisional commitments which the Japanese Government is to undertake it is indicated that Japan is prepared to subscribe to the points upon which tentative agreement had already been reached during the informal preliminary conversations held in Washington. Does the Japanese Government have in mind the points whose formulation as set forth in the draft of the Government of the United States of June 21st are identical to those appearing in the draft which was handed to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador on September 4th or those appearing in some prior draft?

Sould the answer to the first question propounded in paragraph 1 be in the affirmative it would seem that certain of the stipulations contained in the proposals conveyed to the American Ambassador by the Japanese Foreign Minister on September 4th are more limited than are the undertakings provided for in the formulae on which tentative agreement has been previously reached. As an example, in point (F) the Japanese Government undertakes to refrain from discrimination in matters of international commerce in the area of the Southwest Pacific.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 153
September 12, 1941
#557.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

(Part 6 of 6)

2. With relation to the example above cited affecting point (F), is it the intention of the Japanese Government not to undertake similar commitments in regard to its economic activities in other regions notably in China?

3. In regard to the general question of international commerce, further clarification would be desirable with regard to the meaning of the provisions of point (E) relating to American economic activities in China, namely, the precise meaning of the term “equitable basis” and whether this term is intended to mean that Japan shall be the sole judge in determining what constitutes an equitable basis.

4. Is the Government of the United States to understand that the terms of peace which Japan intends to propose to China will be in conformity with the several points appearing in the, annex to, Section 3 of the draft submitted by the Japanese Ambassador on September 4th which is referred to above? In connection with the formula outlined under point (C) dealing with respective attitudes of the United States and Japan towards the European war, while the American Government considers that this formula does not fully meet the (?) requirements of the situation since it leaves Japan free to interpret independently any commitment on this score, the Government of the United States would like to examine the question further before putting forth any suggestions.

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[A-83]

No. 154
September 10, 1941
#553.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

Very Urgent.

When Ambassador GREW called on me at 6:00 p.m. on the 10th, he mentioned the fact that you had submitted a proposal to the United States Government on the 4th. This proposal has not been referred to in your #782[a]. Will you wire me and tell me what proposal is meant?

[a] See III, 127-129 which tells of NOMURA’s conversation with HULL on the 4th at which time HULL dealt with he four basic principles in the Oral Statement.

Trans. 9-10-41
http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET
No. 155
September 10, 1941
#607.
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Re your #553[a].

Prior to receiving the Imperial Government’s reply in your #526[a], I, on my own initiative, with the view of continuing conversations, as well as to sound out their opinion, made a number of additional revisions to the (original ?) American proposal and presented these to them as my own suggested proposals. However, because of the receipt of the Imperial Government’s reply, I withdrew these.

[a] See III, 154 in which Tokyo wires Nomura that Grew mentioned the fact that he had submitted a proposal to the United States Government on the 4th and asks what proposal is meant.
[b] See III, 120 in which Tokyo wires Washington that if the last clause in #524 III, 119 causes misunderstanding, request—to rescind this clause.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 156
September 10, 1941
#798.
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 1 of 2[a].)

Re your #538[a].

On the morning of the 10th I called on HULL, and in compliance with the purport of your telegram, I asked that no (reference ?) be made to (questions ?) concerning Japan in the broadcast which the President is to make on the 11th. HULL did not commit himself one way or the other, but said that on the basis of the past—–regarding maintenance of secrecy, he agreed to it.

I then asked him when a reply to Japan’s proposal of the other day may be expected. HULL replied that he had had no opportunity since the (cabinet meeting ?) held last Friday to confer personally with the President and that since he expected to confer with the President fol-

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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

lowing the broadcast on the 11th, he would reply on the basis of that conference. Remarking that the reply of the Japanese Government seems to have very much narrowed down the (scope ?) of the past conversations, he appeared to be dissatisfied.

[a] See III, 157 in which NOMURA states that he has omitted from his reply the points of agreement and made an extract of the points upon which no agreement had been reached; it also discusses the Greer incident.
[b] See III, 143 in which Tokyo expresses fear that undesirable results may ensue should any reference to Japan- American negotiations be made in the President’s broadcast.

Trans. 9-12-41

No. 157
September 10, 1941
#798.
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 2 of 2)

I told him that, as I had mentioned in my reply, I had omitted the points upon which we have agreed and made an extract of the points upon which no agreement has yet been reached.

At any rate, it seems that the United States Government is trying to find out what Britain, China and the Netherlands have to say about the question. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET

In the course of our conversation HULL said in reference to the discrepancy between the American and German announcements on the Greer incident that while the report of the United States Government is consistent with its past reports, HITLER has time and again contradicted himself and for this reason, personally, he considers the United States report entirely reliable. So remarking, he severely criticized the reliability of the German Government.

Trans. 9-11-41

No. 158
September 10, 1941
#606.
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

Separate wire.

5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States hereby mutually pledge themselves that the Japanese and the American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. In pursuance of this policy, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward the creation of conditions of international trade and international investment under which Japan and the United States will have a reasonable opportunity to secure through the trade process the means of acquiring those goods and commodities which each country needs for the safeguarding and the development of its own economy. They, furthermore, agree to cooperate each with the other, especially toward obtaining commercial,—–, on a non-discriminatory basis, by each of them to supplies of such basic commodities as oil, rubber, tin, nickel, and any other commodity the importation of which is essential to each country for the maintenance of its economic life.

Trans. 9-12-41

[A-85]

No. 159
September 10, 1941
#804.
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 1 of 4)

When I conferred with Secretary HULL the afternoon of the 10th, he said there were as many as four different papers which we had submitted regarding the Japanese proposal given in your #529[a], and since he had some question as how these were inter-related, he would like to clarify the matter. However, I discouraged him from doing so. In the afternoon, at the request of the Secretary, HAMILTON (accompanied by BALLANTINE and SCHMIDT) called on me and asked me to explain the points given below contained in our proposal[b]. I gave them an explanation. Incidentally, they explained their desires. Please———-. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

[a] See III, 122 which gives the text of the Japanese proposal. [b] See III, 161A. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.NET

Trans. 9-12-41

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